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Abstract: The sciences and humanities have long been 
regarded as discrete intellectual cultures, separated by a 
sharp epistemic divide. Recently, however, turns toward 
"transdisciplinarity" have intimated the growing 
importance of overco
Rhetoric of Inquiry and 
transdisciplinary projects that have attempted, 
respectively, to bring humanistic inquiry to the sciences, 
and to bring scientific inquiry to the humanities. This 
paper attempts to trace the parallel genealogies of both 
projects in an attempt to theorize some common traits of 
theory in a transdisciplinary mode. I suggest that 
articulating these projects with one another enables us 
to suppose that building transdisciplinary 
entail a heightened reflexivity concerned with questions 
about scope, methods, and epistemic value
Keywords: Rhetoric of Inquiry, Digital Humanities, 
Transdisciplinarity, Theory, Communication
On May 7, 1959, C.P. Snow delivered his famous Rede
Cambridge University, subsequently published as 
and the Scientific Revolution
intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being 
split into two polar groups” (Snow, 195
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two cultures, he intimated, was a problem of communication. 
Marked by insularity, mutual ignorance of the other, and not a little 
animosity, the rift left “no place where the cultures meet” (Snow, 
1959, 17). For Snow, the consequence of this divide was nothing less 
than the calamitous obstruction of the world’s intellectual and 
social progress. Although Snow subsequently posited a “third 
culture” that might become a communicative medium between the 
two sides (Snow, 1963), it’s his “two cultures” phrase that has “lived 
on as a vague popular shorthand” for the rift that remains between 
the sciences and humanities today (Kimball, 1994, 1). This paper 
concerns some recent efforts to address that rift through the 
growing prevalence of “transdisciplinarity” as a keyword in twenty-
first century intellectual life. 
According to Katri Huutoniemi and her collaborators, attempts 
to overcome disciplinary divides are typically distinguished by three 
widely recognized categories of research: multi-, inter-, and 
transdisciplinarity (Huutoniemi et al., 2010).  Generally, 
multidisciplinarity involves researchers working from within a 
specific disciplinary home to address common issues being 
addressed in parallel by other disciplines.  Interdisciplinarity 
involves researchers from different disciplinary bases working 
together toward common problems, albeit employing their own 
discipline’s framework. Transdisciplinarity involves researchers 
from across disciplines working together to develop new and shared 
conceptual frameworks, theories, and approaches to common 
problems that would transcend extant barriers of inquiry 
(Rosenfield, 1992, 1351).  In a conceptual way, these distinctions 
make sense. But as transdisciplinarity gains traction as an 
intellectual value and priority, better understanding the actual 
practice of building transdisciplinary theory becomes more 
important. 
Certainly, evidence of its practice is clear enough. The field of 
rhetorical studies in particular has lately invigorated its efforts to 
cast rhetoric as a transdisciplinary art—as a kind of “third culture” 
that transcends hidebound epistemic divides. This effort is evident 
in such initiatives as Penn State University Press’s new book series 
on transdisciplinary rhetoric, or in the choice to make “Border 
Rhetorics” the theme for the Rhetoric Society of America’s 2014 
meeting—borders being precisely what rhetoric purportedly 
transcends. The growing membership of the Association for the 
Rhetoric of Science and Technology also underscores a shift in the 
field toward greater appreciation of rhetoric’s transdisciplinary 
nature, marked by ongoing discussions about changing the 
division’s name to accommodate its still-widening purview: the 
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reach of rhetoric now permeating science, technology, and 
medicine. While it may still be premature to proclaim a 
transdisciplinary “turn” in the field, it is surely possible through 
these and other examples to identify a growing institutional 
attentiveness to rhetoric as a valuable means to overcome the 
innumerable divides that partition our pluralistic world. 
And yet, any contemporary interest in understanding rhetoric as 
transdisciplinary must be considered a renewed interest. 
Conversations about the boundary-crossing range of rhetoric date 
back to antiquity and have recurred in our literature ever since. We 
could, for instance, just as well read rhetoric’s transcendent 
potential through Kenneth Burke’s rehabilitation of the ancient 
concepts of rhetorica utens and docens (Burke, 1969), which 
illustrate rhetoric’s inescapability from both practice and theory, as 
we could read it through conversations started by Richard 
McKeon’s sense of rhetoric as architectonic, which suggests that 
rhetoric organizes and structures all other disciplines and arts 
(McKeon, 1970). Conceivably, the rhetorical tradition’s 
longstanding investment in a sensus communis—traced well by 
John Schaeffer as an historically evolving commitment to 
commonsense as an arch-value underwriting all knowledge—could 
even suggest that these recurring conversations may be more than 
occasional topoi, but rather constitutive of the whole tradition 
(Schaeffer, 2004). 
There are, however, important differences between our 
literature’s innumerable claims for rhetoric’s transcendent 
qualities—a review of which would absurdly encompass nearly the 
whole tradition—and the metatheoretical lessons to be learned from 
the traits that rhetorical theory exhibits when invoking 
transdisciplinarity as its salient feature. This paper is concerned 
with the latter: with what it means to practice rhetorical theory in a 
transdisciplinary mode. More broadly, I ask how any academic or 
intellectual tradition goes about claiming transdisciplinary 
relevance. My argument is that theory in a transdisciplinary mode 
does not require articulating, ab ovo, a “new” language or 
paradigm—a “third culture—through which divergent cultures 
might be united, but in practice involves “importing” or “exporting” 
one culture’s metatheoretical assumptions into another’s to form 
something new. This dialectic occurs through theory building 
discourses that take on conspicuous self-reflexivity: an inward gaze 
of metadiscourse directed in three areas. Such discourse is 
concerned with epistemology (i.e., with what counts as a valid 
knowledge claim), with ontology (i.e., with what the 
transdisciplinary enterprise is or is not, as reflected in its scope); 
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and with methodology (i.e., with what approaches to scholarship 
are appropriate to its values and practices). 
Because observing only the rhetorical tradition’s 
transdisciplinary claims would not illustrate more than that 
tradition’s potentially singular approach to building 
transdisciplinary theory, in the pages ahead I put two separate 
transdisciplinary projects side-by-side: first, Rhetoric of Inquiry 
(RoI), and then, Digital Humanities (DH). My premise maintains 
that these discrete but clearly transdisciplinary projects each move 
toward (but have not quite achieved) the “third culture” that Snow 
described. Roughly, RoI has advanced a sense of rhetoric as a 
critical and hermeneutic tool able to crack fissures in the epistemic 
certainties of some fields by exposing how even the most rigid 
knowledge claims are inevitably made through persuasive means. 
DH, meanwhile, uses computational technologies as disambiguated 
and quantitative tools to create more empirical certainty in acts of 
critical interpretation that are otherwise marked by ambiguity and 
multiplicity. 
The purpose of putting RoI in conversation with DH in this way 
is not just to reveal some instructive insights about ways to bridge 
the sciences and humanities. It is likely that humanistic and 
scientific projects—to the extent we even accept Snow’s binary—do 
have recalcitrant and irreconcilable differences, and probably 
always will. The goal is rather to look more closely at those 
characteristics of inquiry that would endeavor to transcend 
hidebound disciplinary divides. By better understanding the 
chiasmatic relationship between two major transdisciplinary 
projects, we might improve our ways of thinking about the actual 
practice and limitations of building theory in a transdisciplinarity 
mode. 
THE RHETORIC OF INQUIRY 
As readers of this journal likely know, the “Rhetoric of Inquiry” as 
such came together as a project in the 1980s when John S. Nelson, 
Allan Megill, and Dierdre (née Donald) McCloskey, collaborating 
from different departments at the University of Iowa, began 
thinking about how different fields of study produce knowledge and 
come to agreement about things.  Of course, these sorts of inquiries 
had been happening for millennia, at least since Socrates held forth 
about differences between truth (epistêmê) and opinion (doxa). 
What happened at Iowa in the eighties brought together these 
timeless inquiries under a new name, institutionalizing the “Project 
on Rhetoric of Inquiry” as a way to examine how knowledge claims 
pertinent to academic disciplines and public affairs are reached, 
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then settled, and how these claims are in turn communicated across 
disciplines. My argument maintains that RoI, at least in the 
trajectory cast from its roots at Iowa, has sought implicitly (not 
necessarily deliberately) to diminish the chasm between Snow’s two 
cultures; and, moreover, it has done so by exporting its 
metatheoretical assumptions into a different tradition. 
The argument suggests that RoI has, by and large, exposed as 
fallacious the chasm between the two cultures of science and 
humanities. It has done so by virtue of some three decades now of 
deeply self-reflexive scholarship, which has time and again smartly 
and coherently revealed the rhetorical underpinnings of even the 
most empirical scientific claims for Truth.  In doing so, it has not 
undermined science so much as demonstrated the productivity of 
its deep-set relationship with humanistic, rhetorical culture.  As its 
name suggests, RoI views rhetoric as immanent in all inquiry. It has 
thus been a call, on one hand, to urge a diverse range of scholars to 
think more seriously about rhetoric as a valuable heuristic for 
understanding their work; and, on the other, to rally those scholars 
already studying rhetoric (mostly in speech communication, but 
also in English departments) to spearhead these new 
transdisciplinary but fundamentally rhetorical understandings of 
argumentation, logic, and processes of discovery.  
In many ways 1984 was the foundational year for RoI. That was 
the year the University of Iowa Humanities Symposium on the 
Rhetoric of the Human Sciences brought together scholars from 
across a nearly comprehensive range of disciplines in the 
humanities and social sciences for a veritable carnival of productive 
navel gazing. The panels and essays presented at this symposium 
were later collected in an edited edition called The Rhetoric of the 
Human Science: Language and Argument in Scholarship and 
Public Affairs (1987)—essentially the urtext of the emergent field, 
at least as it was grounded at Iowa.2  In its lead essay, Nelson et al. 
trace RoI back to its precursors in the Sophists of ancient Greece, 
beginning with Socratic dialogues and developing on through “the 
Ciceronian view that rhetoric is the whole of argument” (Nelson et 
al., 1987, 6). As they tell the story, such views thrived until the 
seventeenth century, when philosophical arguments about the 
subject/object dichotomy positioned “conversation and rhetoric” on 
                                                    
2Herbert Simons foregrounds a different, albeit overlapping story in 
The Rhetorical Turn (Simons, 1990). Other volumes depict their own 
histories. I do not claim to be comprehensive here, but rather to 
emphasize one key strain of RoI’s development and assimilation by the 
academy. (I capitalize the phrase as a reminder of that emphasis). 
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one side against “truth and rationality” on the other (Nelson et al., 
1987, 6).  More specifically, they trace the modern denigration of 
rhetoric to René Descartes, whose rationalism trumped rhetoric’s 
claims at epistemic validity, relegating rhetoric to a place 
somewhere outside of what counts in the process of arriving at 
truth. In their symposium essay and elsewhere (cf. Nelson and 
Megill, 1986), Nelson et al. suggest that subsequent attempts to 
revive rhetoric have taken an anti-Cartesian form.  Tracing its 
gradual revival through the destabilizing philosophies of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein and others, Nelson et al. suggest that 
contemporary scholars must again be attentive to the rhetorical 
nature of all argument and inquiry. RoI, they conclude, “explores 
how reason is rhetorical,” effectively relocating rhetoric as integral 
to any discipline’s pursuit of knowledge (Nelson et al., 1987, 17). 
The historical disparagement of rhetoric and its occasional 
resurgence has been well traced by Michael McGee and John Lyne 
in the essay they contributed from the same symposium (McGee 
and Lyne, 1987). In the common story, rhetoric’s historical quarrel 
with a fixed ideal of truth has lingered since Plato demoted rhetoric 
to mere cookery, thereafter posing a challenge to rhetoric’s status 
and to attempts to write its history (Hariman, 1986; Blair, 1992; 
Aune, 2008). I cannot chart here the full breadth of these historical 
disputes about rhetoric’s epistemic and ethical validity. Suffice to 
say, if they began in disagreements between Plato and the Sophists, 
and reappeared through the modernist view of truth expounded by 
Cartesian rationalism, they took new form in the foundationalist 
views suggested by logical empiricists in the early twentieth 
century. It’s the logical empiricists, finally, that provide a more 
immediate context for Snow’s claims about the irreconcilable “two 
cultures” of science and humanities. 
The basic project of the logical empiricists—beginning with 
David Hume’s empiricism, evolving through Auguste Comte’s 
“positivism,” and reaching its full incarnation in the Vienna Circle 
of Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel and others—can be summarized “by 
being against metaphysics” (Hacking, 1983, 42). Their attempt to 
make philosophy scientific began by denying realism: that is, with 
the premise that no a priori truth exists before observation. The 
goal of such science is not to describe metaphysical reality, but to 
foster prediction and control. Truth begins with sense-data, follows 
the machinery of logic, and is confirmed by a verification principle 
that will only grant a statement’s truth if it can be verified. Under 
such a model, the physical and natural sciences gain an especially 
revered epistemic authority: their inquiries are made following the 
logical empiricist’s insistence on quantifiable empirical data. 
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Inasmuch as that insistence was born in philosophy departments of 
early twentieth-century Vienna and Germany (and later moved to 
Cambridge philosophy departments to escape Nazism), it wants to 
retain for philosophy the disciplinary authority to verify knowledge. 
Don Howard has argued that the philosophy of science—essentially 
this idea of science being subsumed by the supremacy of 
philosophic epistemology—has declined as a result of “our loss of 
the sense of a cultural, social, and political mission” (Howard, 
2003, 77). But RoI tells a different story in its “turns away from 
modernism and foundationalism in the philosophy of science,” and 
in its outright rejection of “the notion that there can be a single and 
autonomous set of rules for inquiry” (Nelson et al., 1987, ix). 
Some important players in how this rejection came to be 
reached include W.V. Quine, Stephen Toulmin, and Thomas Kuhn, 
all of whom helped shift mid-century notions about a logic of 
inquiry toward a rhetoric of inquiry. Characterized largely by post-
positivism, the rejection “emerged in philosophy of science and it 
escalated into philosophy of language.” (For those interested in a 
good account of the rejection of logical empiricism, see Zammito, 
2004, 3.) For example, Quine’s ontology of “semantic ascent” 
moves us away from talk about so-called empirical truths and 
toward talk about the language we use to arrive at them, which is to 
say that Quine recognizes the fallibility of the logical empiricist 
philosophy of science and replaces it with a philosophy of language 
that sees all observation as theory laden. Toulmin—influenced by 
his older colleague Wittgenstein (a legend in the shift to philosophy 
of language)—showed in Uses of Argument how the warrants of 
knowledge claims depend largely on field-contingent rules of 
argumentation (Toulmin, 2003/1958). His notion of “fields of 
argument” thus destabilizes the epistemic authority of positivist 
philosophy and the hard sciences that execute its principles, instead 
suggesting that legitimate warrants for truth claims vary from field 
to field. 
Once Kuhn published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1996/1960), the prior work of Wittgenstein, Quine, Toulmin, and 
others3 could be read retrospectively as an inevitable progression 
toward a radical shift in what counts as a legitimate basis for 
knowledge. Kuhn showed that, even in the hard sciences, standards 
of judgment are attached to “paradigms” that can’t be extrapolated 
beyond their specific historical context, though they change in 
                                                    
3Chaïm Perelman is relevant here, too, though philosophers mostly 
ignore him, just as N.R. Hanson is important but more or less unknown 
by rhetoricians. 
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periods of scientific revolution. That is, our observations are always 
colored by pre-observational suppositions we have by virtue of the 
regnant paradigm. This claim caused a veritable revolution in itself, 
insofar as it suggested that a given paradigm demands, leads to, 
and makes possible only certain kinds of arguments and warrants. 
In other words, if an abiding paradigm determines what means of 
persuasion can be used in a given situation, then paradigms 
themselves are inherently rhetorical. Accordingly, understanding 
scientific progress through a paradigm model, as opposed to a 
cumulative one, makes science itself rhetorical—a hitherto 
unthinkable possibility. As Richard Rorty puts it, ever since Kuhn’s 
monumental book, “Philosophers have been debating whether 
science is rational” (Rorty, 1987, 41). 
The point of sketching all this well-trodden context is to show 
that RoI’s foundational moment, as well as its subsequent 
development, relies on overt self-reflexivity about its 
epistemological position. This self-reflexivity is part of why RoI is 
able to do meaningful work overcoming Snow’s two cultures binary. 
In place of a view of science that holds it apart from the humanities 
because of its comparatively quantifiable, logical, and verifiable 
veracity, there now emerges a strong sense of transdisciplinary 
hybridity, with rhetoric as the commonality all inquiries share. As 
Robert Scott famously put it, this view implies that rhetoric is 
epistemic (Scott, 1967). For scholars who study rhetoric, what 
Herbert W. Simons calls this “rhetorical turn” has turned a 180° on 
the field’s traditionally maligned status, making rhetoric central to 
just about every kind of scholarship and public affair (Simms, 
1990).4 And given the now seemingly endless implications of 
rhetoric, rhetoricians began turning in the 1990s to a heated period 
of self-reflection about their discipline’s scope and methods—the 
other varieties of self-reflexivity mentioned in this paper’s opening 
pages. 
In short, the meta-impulse of this period found scholars of 
rhetoric doing work about what work scholars of rhetoric do.  At 
turns prescriptive and descriptive, such confined scholarship 
attempts both to position the study of rhetoric ontologically within 
an interdisciplinary purview that makes the most sense, and to 
determine how to go about doing such scholarship. These two 
strains of self-reflection have been characterized, respectively, by 
                                                    
4Considering that Quine, Toulmin, Kuhn and many others integral in 
this turn were not working under the aegis of rhetoric, it’s worth asking 
whether those who study rhetoric haven’t seized such ideas as an 
opportunistic chance to reclaim some status for their own discipline. 
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debates between Big Rhetoric vs. Little Rhetoric, and Critical 
Rhetoric vs. Rhetorical Criticism. 
The Big Rhetoric vs. Little Rhetoric debate concerns the viability 
of what Edward Schiappa describes as “the theoretical position that 
everything, or virtually everything, can be described as ‘rhetorical’” 
(Schiappa, 2001, 260). That is, the “rhetorical turn” raised 
questions about rhetoric’s universality that some scholars have 
tried to contest. The idea of “the rhetoric of science”—first 
described by Philip Wander in a paper bearing that name —has 
become the most disputed byproduct of universal or Big Rhetoric, 
and Dilip Gaonkar has been the most outspoken of its critics 
(Wander, 1976; Gaonkar, 1990a, 1990b, 1993). Schiappa’s useful 
narrative of the debate isolates three primary critiques of Big 
Rhetoric: (1) if rhetoric is everywhere, it’s nowhere (the definitional 
critique); (2) Big Rhetoric leads to weak scholarship (the evaluative 
critique); and (3) without a discrete identity and clear disciplinary 
history, the discipline of rhetoric is doomed (the political critique) 
(Schiappa, 2001, 267). As for critiques about the rhetoric of 
science—this inevitable byproduct of rhetoric’s expanding claims to 
relevance—Leah Ceccarelli likewise finds three main tacks 
mobilized by those trying to defend science from the slippery reach 
of rhetoric and the humanities: (1) the “recalcitrance of nature;” (2) 
the “exegetical equality” of scientific communication; and (3) the 
“institutionally driven” nature of scientific text production 
(Ceccarelli, 2001, 315). Both Schiappa and Ceccarelli argue that 
these critiques don’t hold up.  Rhetoric really is everywhere, and 
much of what rhetoricians do is show how. 
In that case, though, the tradition becomes vulnerable to 
questions about what it is those studying rhetoric are supposed to 
practice, and how they ought to do so.  Gaonkar traces the 
foundations of rhetorical criticism to Herbert Wichelns’s interest in 
the literary criticism of oratory, suggesting that, “Wichelns sets into 
motion a particular dialectic between object and method that later 
critics have had to negotiate” (Wichelns, 1925; Gaonkar, 1990, 
292). Raymie McKerrow earlier hinted at this dialectic in his 
suggestion that what we commonly call “rhetorical criticism” might 
more meaningfully be called “critical rhetoric”—the change in 
emphasis indicating an important difference in approaches to our 
work (McKerrow, 1989). If the dialectic can be split into two sides—
a critical rhetoric or a rhetorical criticism—Michael Leff and 
Andrew Sachs, and Michael McGee, respectively, make the best 
candidates to represent either one. Leff and Sachs advocate for the 
textual object as that which does the rhetorical acting, while the 
critic’s job is to illuminate the object and the artistry behind it (Leff 
Chris Ingraham 10 Poroi 11,1 (May 2015) 
and Sachs, 1990; McGee, 1990). Conversely, McGee argues that it is 
critics who perform the rhetorical act of giving otherwise 
fragmented texts the unity of a meaning and value. In light of 
claims, post-Scott, that rhetoric is epistemic, the methodological 
debate between critical rhetoric and rhetorical criticism bears 
crucially upon a RoI that would use rhetoric to expose rhetoric in 
knowledge claims. In other words, the debates over scope and 
method here find their solution in hybridity, whereby rhetoric is 
both object and method—a key move to theorizing in a 
transdisciplinary mode. 
Notwithstanding the fair objection that not all critical rhetoric 
scholars see rhetorical reflexivity as endemic to their project—a 
project interested rather in merging rhetoric and critical theory in 
service of social critique—I think we at least have to recognize that 
RoI and Critical Rhetoric are mutually implicated in a measure of 
reflexivity that one brings out when read through the other. 
Certainly RoI, at least, is both constrained by rhetoric and 
inexhaustible because of it. The rhetorical practice RoI describes is 
one both attentive to manifestations of rhetoric in everyday life and 
to the inescapable rhetoricity inherent in shoring these 
manifestations together from the discursive practices all around us. 
In its transdisciplinary register, rhetoric resides not just in the 
academy or dizzying heights of theory, but in the micro-political 
and vernacular realm. To discuss it is to enact it. 
In the long rhetorical tradition, no project has mobilized a more 
concerted effort to imagine rhetoric’s transdisciplinarity in this way 
than the Project on RoI. Yet, while such a project survives at Iowa, 
both in this journal and in academic courses that bears its name, 
and while it occasionally emerges elsewhere in graduate courses 
that treat RoI largely as an amberized historical movement, it’s 
worth noting that references to the “rhetoric of inquiry” as such 
have all but disappeared from current conversations in the field. 
Google’s Ngram Viewer, for instance, which scans millions of books 
to measure the recurrence of words over time, reveals a graph for a 
“rhetoric of inquiry” search that looks like a single beat on an EKG: 
the phrase is nonexistent until 1984, spikes in 1993, and is virtually 
nonexistent again today. One question to follow from this is 
whether RoI has become so well established that its tenets are now 
assimilated into the field’s unstated assumptions—rendering RoI 
“invisible”—or whether RoI’s project has rather been refuted and 
rendered obsolete, untenable, or irrelevant to how scholars want to 
understand rhetoric today. The recent (re)turn in the field of 
rhetorical studies to theorizing in a transdisciplinary mode makes a 
strong case for the former. By comparison, a similarly 
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transdisciplinary project still very much invested in establishing its 
own stakes and identity can be seen in the Digital Humanities, to 
which I now turn. 
THE DIGITAL HUMANITIES 
If the metatheoretical assumptions of RoI can be traced to give its 
project a semblance of coherence, the same luxury cannot so easily 
be claimed for the still emergent area of scholarship known as 
Digital Humanities. Indeed, the first thing to say about DH is that 
it’s terribly difficult to say anything definitive about it. Even the 
grammar is problematic: is it DH plural, or the DH singular? 
(Fitzpatrick, 2011). Whatever the usage, when articulated with RoI, 
the DH can be treated as a similarly general category of 
transdisciplinary inquiry with a traceable history, albeit no clear 
consensus surrounding its identity. From case to case, the inquiries, 
methods, and metatheoretical assumptions of scholarship 
undertaken in its name are just too diverse to accommodate any 
unanimity of DH’s scope or purpose. For that reason, and so not to 
succumb to reductionism in this section’s effort to describe DH at 
large, I offer a necessarily different approach than the close 
exploration of those metatheoretical underpinnings I tried to 
illuminate for RoI.  I will suggest, though, that precisely its want of 
a unifying metatheoretical sensibility has given rise in DH 
scholarship to the same heightened reflexivity, ontological 
questions about scope, and concerns about epistemology and 
methodology that we’ve already seen RoI exhibit. 
Indeed, DH’s resistance to definition may be its most unifying 
trait. Literally hundreds of divergent definitions have been 
proffered to explain DH.5 There’s just no consensus about what DH 
is or does, if it’s a field, a discipline, a subject, a method, an 
epistemic culture, or, generally, whether its instantiations cohere 
around any particular set of theories, directives, interests, or 
priorities. “‘Digital humanities,’” as Patrik Svensson puts it—and 
notice his scare quotes—“probably defies any precise definition” 
(Svensson, 2010, 20). Dave Parry goes so far as to suggest, “none of 
us really knows what digital humanities is” (Parry, 2011, 429). 
These positions are as close to a consensus as we are likely to get. 
As a result, even those who attempt to define DH gesture toward its 
undefinability, tending to be broad and vague, as if afraid, on one 
hand, to limit its possibilities, and on the other, to exclude any of its 
many iterations. 
                                                    
5See www.whatisdigitalhumanities.com for a compendium of 500 
such definitions. 
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For instance, Burdick et al., in a major book on the subject, 
define it like this: 
Digital Humanities refers to new modes of scholarship 
and institutional units for collaborative, 
transdisciplinary, and computationally engaged 
research, teaching and publication. 
Digital Humanities is less a unified field than an array of 
convergent practices that explore a universe in which 
print is no longer the primary medium in which 
knowledge is produced and disseminated (Burdick et al., 
2012, 122). 
As definitions go, that’s awfully capacious. Though they 
elaborate, the difficulty of pinning DH down leads them into 
apophasis, describing DH by what it is not. Similarly, Alan Liu, in 
his attempt to assess the state of DH in the academy today, admits 
to defining it “with unusual breadth” and a “supervening sense that 
combines ‘humanities computing’ or ‘text-based’ digital humanities 
. . . and new media studies” (Liu, 2011, 10). Any number of similarly 
broad definitions could be furnished. The point is that just about all 
characterizations of the DH as a field or idea virtually tremble with 
the discomfort of self-definition; there are just no ready-made 
academic or epistemic frameworks into which DH neatly fits. 
The reason for this is clear once one understands DH as 
fundamentally transdisciplinary. Indeed, the definition proffered 
by Burdick et al., quoted above, names “transdisciplinarity” as one 
of DH’s constitutive features. In their understanding, this 
transdisciplinarity is one way of marking DH’s status as a set of 
“new modes” for scholarship—a newness that, in turn, contributes 
to the apparently universal difficulty of finding a language 
appropriate to describe DH in the first place.  Others have made the 
case more directly. Yu-Wei Lin, in an essay included in an edited 
collection called Understanding Digital Humanities (which itself 
consists almost entirely of chapters devoted to its eponymous task), 
argues that DH signal a “shift toward transdisciplinarity in the 
humanities” by merging computer-assisted tools for both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of texts with the more 
traditional humane analysis that has hitherto been the mainstay of 
humanities research (Lin, 2012, 312). Following work by Patricia 
Rosenfield (1992), Lin suggests that the DH are transdisciplinary in 
the sense that DH work “radicalizes existing disciplinary norms and 
practices and allows researchers to go beyond their parent 
disciplines, using a shared conceptual framework that draws 
together concepts, theories, and approaches from various 
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disciplines into something new that transcends them all” (Lin, 
2012, 298). Again, this “something new” is at issue. In the language 
of Snow’s two cultures model, a transdisciplinary notion of DH 
would seem to approach the elusive “third culture” for which there 
is no cohesive terminology, no methodology, no framework for 
conceptualization, and so on. No wonder no one can agree about 
understanding the DH. 
But a comparative understanding, achieved by thinking 
metatheoretically about DH alongside RoI, may help to develop 
some ways to think through the implications of theorizing in a 
transdisciplinary mode. What’s interesting about articulating these 
two particular cases within Snow’s framework is the chiasmatic 
relationship that emerges in their comparison. To put it in terms 
Snow might have appreciated, RoI makes science humanistic; DH 
makes the humanities scientific. Put differently, just as RoI exports 
a rhetorical lens to inform the inquiries of other disciplines, the DH 
import into the humanities the epistemic tools of the sciences. Of 
course, the complexity of both projects goes well beyond such a 
simple import/export calculus.6 But a closer look at the history of 
DH does begin to show that the metatheoretical stakes in its case 
are quite similar to those we’ve already seen in the parallel story of 
RoI. 
Whereas the story offered about RoI traced its particular 
trajectory from its roots at the University of Iowa, the story offered 
here about DH follows its lineage back to a related field known as 
“humanities computing.” Humanities computing is what one called 
DH before it existed under that name. The titular shift from one to 
the other has a specific history with implications beyond the scope 
of this essay. (For more on the change in terminology, see McCarty, 
2005; Svensson, 2009; and Kirschenbaum, 2011.) In brief, though, 
while the two terms refer to and connote different enterprises, they 
can be understood as growing from a more or less common 
intellectual movement with a specific founder and moment of 
formation: Roberto Busa, in 1949. 
An Italian Jesuit priest with a Ph.D., Father Busa used an early 
computer to make an automatically generated concordance of the 
works of Thomas Aquinas—totaling some 11 million words of 
Medieval Latin (Busa, 1980; Winter, 1999). Concordances had 
                                                    
6It is not the case, for instance, that DH scholars rely only on what is 
sometimes called “distant reading” or “macroanalysis.” Certainly “close 
reading” and the whole range of hermeneutic practices are also involved 
in work that falls under the DH name. 
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existed before7 but never before had they been automated so as to 
make quantitative analysis of huge bodies of text convenient and 
efficient. Busa’s concordance changed the nature of humanities 
scholarship, or at least its tools, giving a previously qualitative field 
greater quantitative exactitude. After Busa, humanities scholars 
began to recognize that computers could radically change the 
possibilities for critical engagement by increasing the verifiability of 
interpretive claims about different texts. Not only could they index, 
count word frequency, and create concordances of literary works, 
but computer-generated data could also be used to study style, 
authorship, and a host of textual attributions previously only 
accessible from a qualitative frame. 
Cast in this lineage, it is easier to see how the quantitative 
empiricism and analytic efficiencies of the digital realm have 
imbued DH with a methodological rigor that descends from a 
decidedly non-humanistic cultural lens. To put a point on it, 
although concerned with understanding and interpreting 
humanistic texts—religious tracts, novels, plays, and so forth—
humanities computing provided the basis for an emergent DH tied 
to the specific epistemic culture of the sciences.8 As Stephen 
Ramsay sees it, that means that the whole raison d'être of the DH 
now “is scientific method joined to humanistic inquiry” (Ramsay, 
2011, ix). Given its roots in humanities computing, the DH as such 
thus operates bestride, on one hand, an epistemic culture of science 
inherited from the modernist rationalism of Descartes and the 
foundationalism of the logical empiricists, and, on the other, a 
humanities tradition that honors the likes of Nietzsche’s moves to 
renounce categorical conceptions of truth, or the subsequent 
poststructural and postmodernist rejection of the universal claims 
of grand narratives (Nietzche 2012/1873; Lyotard, 1979). By its very 
                                                    
7The first known concordance was the Concordantiae Sacrorum 
Bibliorum, a concordance of the Vulgate Bible, dated to 1230 (Hindley, 
2013). Of course, mechanisms to manipulate knowledge predate even 
that. We hardly recognize anymore that books themselves are one such 
mechanism. A book is, in the words of I.A. Richards, “a machine to think 
with” (Richards, 1926, 1). Such mechanisms continue to evolve over time, 
from ancient codices to Dewey’s decimal system to the powerful search 
engine algorithms of today. The point is that Father Busa’s concordance 
was the first to develop computing technology for use in the analysis of 
non-digital texts. 
8 Epistemic cultures, as Karin Knorr Cetina describes them, are “those 
amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms—bonded through affinity, 
necessity, and historical coincidence—which, in a given field, make up 
how we know what we know” (Cetina, 1999, 1). 
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nature, then, as Susan Hockey explains, DH “has had to embrace 
‘the two cultures’, to bring the rigor and systematic unambiguous 
procedural methodologies characteristic of the sciences to address 
problems within the humanities that had hitherto been most often 
treated in a serendipitous fashion” (Hockey, 2004, 1). Clearly, in 
the lineage of Busa’s humanities computing, the growth of DH has 
found it straddling Snow’s two epistemic cultures.9 The ubiquitous 
self-reflexivity that marks its academic discourse today might then 
be explained in part as an effort to understand on which foot to put 
the most weight. 
Indeed, Patrick Svensson has argued that the expansion of DH 
has brought with it the inclusion of heterogeneous epistemologies 
from different disciplines, which is one reason DH is so difficult to 
pin down (Svensson, 2009). Its “intersectional position” makes it 
quintessentially transdisciplinary: DH, he says, “tend[s] to depend 
on interaction with other institutions to a larger extent than most 
traditional departments and disciplines” (Svensson, 2011, 37). Such 
dependence only complicates the epistemological foundation of the 
field, making it look inward for an epistemic trump card like the 
one RoI finds in a universal rhetoric. As was the case with RoI, the 
search to find and justify its own epistemic culture charges DH 
scholarship’s indulgence in self-analysis. 
In short, as transdisciplinary projects, DH and RoI both bring 
into focus the comparative epistemologies of the sciences and 
humanities. RoI’s version of this story has been told. But DH, too, is 
invested in a self-reflexive effort to scrutinize its epistemological 
assumptions: “to ask, in the context of computing, what can (and 
must) be known of our artifacts, how we know what we know about 
them, and how new knowledge is made” (McCarty, 2003, 1231). 
The difficulty is, while RoI privileges rhetoric—amorphous, 
mercurial, slippery rhetoric—in the making of knowledge, DH 
seems to privilege the logic of the computer—“a device that is 
wholly intolerant toward equivocation and uncertainty” (Ramsay, 
2011, ix).  Accordingly, the “dominant assumption” of DH holds 
that “if the computer is to be useful to the humanist, its efficacy 
must necessarily lie in the aptness of the scientific metaphor for 
                                                    
9Hockey seems to make this argument in her compelling four-phase 
genealogy of the field, beginning with Father Busa’s work and its 
influence through the sixties, passing to a period of institutional 
consolidation in the seventies and eighties, expanding further with the 
growing ubiquity and repercussions of personal computing by the early 
nineties, and entering its current state of multiplicity in the Internet age 
today (Hockey, 2004).  
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humanistic study” (Ramsay, 2011, x). Here we have a problem.  If, 
as we’ve seen, RoI makes problematic the “scientific metaphor” of 
knowledge, then where does that leave a DH held up by an 
epistemic culture of science, when that very culture is now thought 
in fact to be undergirded by an epistemic culture of rhetoric? 
In a general register, one answer to this question might be that 
transdisciplinarity simply fails. But another, more interesting 
possibility is that a given transdisciplinary project may itself 
transcend disciplines, though that same transdisciplinary project 
may have a harder time jibing with another transdisciplinary 
alternative. Such a curious possibility suggests that talking across 
epistemic borders is feasible in itself, but that different attempts to 
do so may have a hard time finding a common language. The next 
question to ask, then, is a matter of scope. In other words, if the 
epistemic assumptions of one transdisciplinary movement are 
incommensurable with another, despite appearances to the 
contrary, where do we draw the limits on claims of metatheoretical 
commonality across areas of inquiry? 
The Project on RoI spurred this question in the form of the Big 
Rhetoric vs. Little Rhetoric debates (Gross and Keith, 1997). In the 
case of DH, a corresponding concern can be found in the 2011 DH 
conference at Stanford University, which had the theme, “Big Tent 
Digital Humanities.” Arguments about big tent DH have involved 
the field’s disciplinary allegiances and the scope of its interests and 
responsibilities. Once thriving, the humanities have lately come 
upon tough times. As rhetoric has traditionally been maligned with 
low status in and out of the academy, and in turn sees hopes for 
redemption in the universalism of RoI, so too has hope for the 
bleak outlook of humanities scholarship been vested in the 
encompassing significance of DH. “Arguably,” Svensson suggests, 
“much of the hope and interest currently invested in the digital 
humanities relates to an inclusive notion of the field and a sense of 
the digital humanities as a way of reconfiguring the humanities” 
(Svensson, 2011, 36). Debates over the “big tent” scope of DH thus 
have institutional and intellectual repercussions as scholars stake 
ground for the breadth of their inquiries and the institutional 
affiliations and funding necessary to carry them out. 
But if ontological questions about DH’s scope arise from its 
troubled epistemic footing, they’re also implicated in equally 
animated debates about DH’s methods. This, too, should sound 
familiar to the story of RoI; both find their investigation of scope 
and method inseparably intertwined. The link in both cases is each 
field’s respective objects of inquiry.  As Gaonkar illustrated, the 
implications of rhetoric’s alleged universality made it necessary to 
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reevaluate the relationship between object and method that had 
existed in the discipline from the start (Gaonkar, 1990).  The 
ensuing argument over rhetorical criticism and critical rhetoric 
took sides over what counted as the discipline’s objects and 
methods. A parallel argument in DH troubles the field in the form 
of discussions about what counts as its texts and its tools. 
It’s not just that DH scholars use computers to crunch big data 
or aid in the analysis of “texts” pertinent to a humanistic interest. 
Some DH work also retains traditional humanistic methods and 
epistemological standards (for instance, the “close reading” done by 
a human interpreter-critic) to approach new objects of inquiry such 
as digital hypertexts or the implications of new media more 
broadly. In this sense, their objects of inquiry are digital, but their 
methods or basis for knowledge claims are not necessarily so. 
Arguments about the size of a DH “tent” are thus implicitly 
arguments about whether the tent “be taken to include critical work 
construing the digital as an object of inquiry rather than as a tool” 
(Svensson, 2011, 41).  Here again, the comparative epistemologies 
of the sciences and humanities are never far away.  Johanna 
Drucker points out that when humanistic scholars incorporate 
complex advances in data mining, geospatial representation, and 
visualization protocols into their work, they inevitably use methods 
“whose epistemological foundations and fundamental values are at 
odds with, or even hostile to, the humanities” (Drucker, 2011, 86). 
These methods, she says, are “positivistic, strictly quantitative, 
mechanistic, reductive and literal”—they are “anathema to 
humanistic thought” and “fundamentally resistant to qualitative 
approaches” (Drucker, 2011, 86).  What Drucker calls “the 
persuasive and seductive rhetorical force” of these technologies 
ends up disguising the inevitable constraints of their method with 
the promise of their inexhaustible application, necessitating some 
reflexivity about the process of inquiry (Drucker, 2011, 86). 
In the account I have been trying to present, this reflexivity 
comes to the fore. The DH began with scholars using the tools of 
computing technology to conduct more quantitatively grounded 
literary analysis. As the value of these tools for further applications 
such as database design, imaging, numerical analysis, cataloging, 
and other functions has become more clear to other disciplines, a 
“methodological commons” has arisen among several disciplines 
united by an interest in using digital technologies to improve their 
scholarship (McCarty, 2003). Inevitably, as technologies advance, 
these tools have become more complex; they’ve come to be guided 
by theories that challenge the positivist tradition of computing that 
made them such useful tools to begin with. By now tools themselves 
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have become worthwhile objects of inquiry, and their creation alone 
has become inherently valuable. Once that has happened, when 
what was once treated as an analytic tool itself becomes a text for 
analysis or invention, the question becomes, What tools or methods 
do we use to analyze the tools? A meta-discourse seems inevitable. 
In short, the transdisciplinary nature of DH gives rise to stakes 
that are not just epistemological or methodological, but 
fundamentally ontological as the diversity and scope of its concerns 
become increasingly expansive. This is why DH so resists 
definition. Its epistemic culture, its methods, its scope, and what 
DH is in the first place all draw the field ever inward toward 
recurrent self-analysis. Given the metadiscursive parallels between 
RoI and DH, this begins to reveal a wonderful irony: namely, the 
attempt to chart and inexhaustibly expand a field’s relevance and 
reach seems to require the extreme constraint of that field by 
limiting its discursive practices to discussion of its discursive 
practices. And what’s more constrained than that? 
 
CONCLUSIONS: COMMUNICATION AND 
TRANSDISCIPLINARITY 
Although self-reflexivity is a demonstrable characteristic of the two 
transdisciplinary projects I have discussed, this does not mean that 
where self-reflexivity exists so too necessarily does 
transdisciplinary theory. At some point or another, all academic 
fields probably engage in some reflection about their assumptions 
and values, their methods and epistemic commitments. Doing so is 
a useful way to monitor and ensure a discipline’s internal rigor, 
coherence, and quality.  Doing so also creates an opportunity to 
address the politics of institutional practices that may or may not 
obstruct the field’s ability to advance its aims; for instance, by 
questioning the prevalence of males in the sciences, examining 
citational politics relative to tenure, or challenging the peer-review 
process. Self-reflexivity alone, then, is not a sufficient condition for 
describing theory in a transdisciplinary mode. 
A key implication of this paper’s discussion, however, is that 
self-reflexivity is a necessary condition of transdisciplinary theory. 
Admittedly, based on a comparison of only two projects, it is hardly 
justifiable to conclude that all transdisciplinary theory exhibits the 
traits shared by RoI and DH.  Investigating a wider sample size of 
other avowedly transdisciplinary enterprises would strengthen any 
claims for a wider “theory of transdisciplinary theory.” But there’s 
the rub. Transdisciplinary theory is, inevitably, a theory of itself.  It 
Chris Ingraham 19 Poroi 11,1 (May 2015) 
is a theory in which metatheoretical commitments are asked to 
bridge disciplinary or two-culture divides. As such, it cannot not 
reflect on its own assumptions—epistemological, ontological, 
methodological—because the whole point of theory in the mode of 
its transdisciplinarity is to make a case for a transcendent kind of 
inquiry: a kind of inquiry possible precisely because of its 
attentiveness to which epistemological, ontological, and 
methodological commitments enable different “cultures” to 
interact. 
At a minimum, I hope to have shown that such attentiveness is 
evident in the similar if chiasmatic trajectories, concerns, and 
practices of RoI and DH. To stop there would, I think, be valuable 
enough. But the implications of comparing these two projects go 
further. Curiously, the metatheoretical considerations of 
epistemology, ontology, and methodology that I’ve identified in 
both RoI and DH are almost exactly the same considerations that 
James Anderson has influentially identified as the fundamental 
types of metatheoretical assumptions undergirding all theories of 
communication (Anderson, 1996; Anderson and Baym, 2004)10. In 
this light, it is conceivable to imagine that transdisciplinary theories 
are inherently also tacit theories of communication. And in that 
case, the central challenge posed by theory in a transdisciplinary 
mode may be to identify what theory of communication it advances. 
How is communication itself, as C.P. Snow intimated in 1959, the 
most formidable barrier in the two cultures divide? The search for 
an answer would seem to make the field of communication theory 
itself the site of transdisciplinary inquiry par excellence. 
One problem, though, as Robert T. Craig has drawn on 
Anderson’s work to show, is that no coherent field of 
communication theory even exists (Craig, 1999). Instead, Craig has 
identified eight major yet discrete traditions of communication 
theory: rhetoric, semiotics, cybernetics, phenomenology, social 
psychology, socio-cultural theory, critical theory, and (in a 2007 
extension of his original argument) pragmatism (Craig, 2007).  Any 
theory of communication, he says, derives from the metatheoretical 
assumptions of one of these traditions. Craig’s constitutive “meta-
model” in turn suggests that in place of coherence we are better off 
addressing the “commonly understood (though always contestable) 
set of assumptions that would enable productive argumentation 
                                                    
10Anderson includes methodology within separate axiological and 
praxeological categories. Although I have not used these categories in my 
analysis of RoI and DH, I suspect adhering fully to Anderson’s heuristic 
would yield similar results. 
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across the diverse traditions of communication theory” at large 
(Craig, 1999, 120).  Such a program, in other words, recognizes that 
to theorize communication in the first place is to engage in 
discourse about discourse, which is fundamentally the same self-
reflexive position that RoI and DH have found themselves unable to 
escape, though each from their own traditions. Applied to 
transdisciplinarity, Craig’s meta-model implies that despite 
transdisciplinary theory’s aim of advancing metatheoretical 
commitments capable of transcending all disciplinary divides, 
different transdisciplinary projects will themselves always remain 
in negotiation with one another. A trans-transdisciplinary theory 
remains elusive. 
Of course, if the RoI and the DH make communication an arch-
concern of transdisciplinarity, they do not do so conspicuously. In 
fact, “communication” per se remains largely off their radar. The 
DH scholar Alan Liu has noticed this peculiarity and remarked that 
digital humanists in particular “rarely give equal weight to the idea 
of communication” as they do to the epistemological, ontological, 
and methodological concerns I’ve been considering here, even 
though communication seems rather at the shared heart of both a 
social science and humanistic project (Liu, 2011, 17). “The digital 
humanities on both its text-oriented and new media studies side,” 
Liu concludes perplexedly, “have hit the mute button on 
communication” (Liu, 2011, 17).  Considering that scholars of 
rhetoric are often housed within speech communication 
departments, the RoI’s silence regarding communication is equally 
peculiar. 
But the absence of an overt attention to communication from 
both projects makes some sense if we begin to understand theory in 
its transdisciplinary mode as constitutive of—not merely “about”—
the communication theory tradition to which its import/export 
maneuvers are committed. RoI, obviously, privileges the 
metatheoretical assumptions of the rhetorical tradition. If DH 
scholars are still engaged in debates about their project’s 
cohesiveness, that is perhaps because their transdisciplinary 
inclinations show inconsistent allegiances: to a cybernetic tradition 
here, to a semiotic tradition there, and so on. In the larger context 
of the differences between Snow’s “two cultures,” we would of 
course be wise to acknowledge that RoI, in its own self-conception, 
has been concerned specifically with the human sciences, and 
accordingly might be better seen as a kind of outreach from the 
humanities side that has largely been unreciprocated from the 
sciences. Conversely, the DH have reached out and pulled in some 
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aspects of scientific culture, from what I can see with little 
resistance or concern from the sciences. 
That does not mean that either program is necessarily what we’d 
call the “third culture” that transdisciplinarity seems to promise. 
What it does suggest, I think, is that attempts at transdisciplinarity, 
such as these programs endeavor, are bound to implicate 
themselves in reflexive conversations about their epistemic values, 
methods, and scope of influence. Those of us invested particularly 
in the resurgence of transdisciplinarity as a privileged mode of 
rhetorical theory can benefit from these insights and endeavor to 
avoid, or at least acknowledge, the reflexivity that sometimes gums 
up our actual business. Ultimately, it may be wise to see 
transdisciplinarity in its own right as a kind of ninth tradition of 
communication theory—or perhaps, as some kind of meta-meta-
model that requires the mind’s equivalent of double-dutch just to 
comprehend. Theory in a transdisciplinary mode is fundamentally 
intertextual. Its discourses converge and diverge, collide and 
overlap, fragment and grow. These are all promising things. 
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